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Abstract
This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating
and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient
but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the “replacing”
manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible
voter behavior.
JEL code: D72
Key words: Alternative vote, Manipulation, Behavioral voting.
1 Introduction
The voting rule called the Alternative Vote is a system for electing a sin-
gle candidate from (complete or incomplete) rankings, through a successive
elimination process. During this process, candidates receiving the fewest
first-place votes are iteratively eliminated from the ballots, and these votes
are transferred to the second-best, third-best,... candidate. This rule has
been studied under various names and variants (Lijphart 1994, Farrell &
McAllister 2006). The denomination Single Transferable Vote is used in the
Social Choice and Welfare literature and probably better reflects the process
of ballot counting, but this name usually refers to the use of similar ballot-
ing process for proportional representation in multi-seats elections (Bowler
& Grofman 2000, Nurmi 2006). The name Alternative Vote is the stan-
dard in Political Science, when only one candidate has to be elected (Farrell
∗48 Bd. Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France. jean-francois.laslier@ens.fr
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2001) as, for instance is done in Ireland for the presidential election. Elimi-
nating the candidates who are least often top-ranked is the Hare process of
transfers and I shall refer to this voting rule as the Alternative Vote with
Hare transfers, in short AV, rule1. These rules bear some common feature
with the two-round majority rule used in most countries for single-winner
elections, and variants of AV are sometimes referred to as Instant Runoff.
The literature has early proposed various examples in which, if all voters
but one vote sincerely, the last voter can, by submitting a non-sincere rather
than a sincere ballot, change the outcome in way favorable to her (Doron
& Kronick 1977), what is called “manipulability”. But an argument often
put forward in favor of these kind of rules is that they are, in practice,
immune to manipulation from the side of the voters (White 2010). Two
reasons are invoked by the defenders of this view: the frequency of instances
in which AV is manipulable is low, and manipulation, when theoretically
doable, is too complex and too computationally demanding (Chamberlain
1985, Tideman 2006, Bartholdi & Orlin 1991, Walsh 2010). The aim of
this note is to challenge this view; in practice AV should not be considered
immune to manipulation.
Instead of taking an abstract point of view, the next section contrasts
two kinds of strategic reasoning that can be of some importance for the
analysis of voting rules: overstating and replacing. I will argue that both are
psychologically and cognitively sound mental processes, and thus plausible
models of political behavior.
Then application is done to one-dimensional Politics, using both analyt-
ical arguments and computer simulations. The framework is essentially the
traditional Left-Right model Politics, with candidates and voters on a sin-
gle line, voters having single-peaked preferences, and the majority-winning
candidate at the median of the voters’ location.
The one-dimentional model of Politics is by far the main intellectual ref-
erence in contemporary Political Science, and the most used model. But
it has obvious limits, and simulations are also presented for the multi-
dimensional case.
I find that AV is not sensitive to the overstatement tactics, in contrast
with other voting rules. But I also find that AV is sensitive to the replacement
tactics, so that this rule should be considered as prone to tactical votes.
1That is the commonly used variant. Eliminating the candidate who is most often
ranked last defines another rule, called the Coombs rule (Coombs 1964; Grofman & Feld
2004), which turns out to be totally different. In particular the Coombs rule is Condorcet
consistent in single-peaked domains of preferences whereas AV is not. This paper only
considers the AV rule.
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Incidentally I also find that this should not be considered as bad news since,
in many cases, social welfare improves when voters strategize. The conclusion
that AV is manipulable is opposed to received knowledge on the matter and
in particular contrasts with analysis published in the Computational Social
Choice literature (Walsh 2010). The last section of this paper discusses that
point.
In the framework where the voters’ opinions are represented by ordi-
nal preferences (rankings) on the set of alternative candidates, the logical
possibility of many counter-intuitive effects of voting rules (usually called
“paradoxes”) which open the possibility of “manipulation” is well-known.
For instance, Felsenthal & Tideman (2014) go into the details of the possi-
bility of monotonicity failures for several voting rules and Green-Armitage
(2014) consider extreme variations of overstatement of the following form:
all the voters who prefer a candidate (A) to an other candidate (B) give
the worst possible rank to A (“burrying”) or the best possible rank to B
(“compromising”).
A more pragmatic approach aims at going into the details of what kinds
of manipulation are feasible in which context, in order to assess the practical
importance of the phenomena highlighted by the theory. This can be done
by simulation and experimentally.
For simulations, early work was done with symmetrical data-generating
processes (often called “cultures”in this literature) such as the “impartial
culture.” See for instance Nitzan (1985), or Favardin & Lepelley (2006).
Laslier (2010) stresses the importance of the voters’ responsive behavior and
of the choice of the culture (“Rousseauist”, impartial, spatial, conflicting,
redistributive,...) for mimicking various real-world problems, but does not
study the Alternative Vote.
As to experiments, the seminal experiments were realized by Forsythe
et al. (1993, 1996) who prove that voters act in reaction to the information
they have about the respective chances of candidates. Van der Straeten et al.
(2010, 2015), in a similar framework, try to detect, in the laboratory what
kinds of strategies voters use or not. They confirm that voters are responsive
to polls, and find that voters rely on heuristics and do vote strategically, as
far as manipulations are straightforward enough; unfortunately, their main
focus is not on the Alternative Vote.
This note is organized as follows: The next section presents what I mean
by the “overstating” and the “replacing” strategies, Section 3 presents the
results and Section 4 concludes.
3
2 Heuristic responses
2.1 Overstating
Strategic voting under most voting rules amounts to overstate preferences
(Nu´n˜ez & Laslier 2014): if you are not satisfied with the election of A and
you consider electing B instead, then you should give as much strength as
possible in your vote against A and in favor of B. When ballots are rankings
or grades, one would pretend that she ranks B first and A last, or would
give B the best possible grade and A the worst.
This logic does not operate for 2-round majority voting, nor for AV. The
important case is the following. One candidate, say A, is winning in the last
round against another candidate B. Suppose that this result was obtained
from sincere votes, and suppose now that voters who prefer B to A modify
their votes as described above, with the intention of having B, rather than
A, elected. I claim that, in most cases, this manipulation will not change
the result of the election: the two candidates in the last round will still be A
and B and, since the comparison between A and B is obviously not altered,
A will still be elected. This claim can be formally demonstrated in the case
of three candidates:
Proposition 1 With three candidates, overstating true preferences with re-
spect to the two last-round candidates does not change the outcome
Proof. Let A, B, and C be the three candidates, with A winning to B at
the second round, C being eliminated at the first round. Suppose that some
voters overstate their preference between A and B: those who prefer B to
A now may rank B first and A last, and those who prefer A to B now may
rank A first and B last. Then notice that all voters who sincerely rank A
or B at first place still do it, therefore the vote count at first round for A
and B can only increase. Since C was eliminated before the manipulation,
it still is. QED
The same result does not hold for more than 3 candidates and ad hoc
examples of successful “overstating” manipulation under AV can be imag-
ined for 4 candidates or more. Such a tricky example is provided in the
Appendix but, from the preceding proposition, one can see that these votes
cannot alter only the three candidates who remain last, because in the pref-
erence profile restricted to these three candidates, the proposition applies.
The manipulation has thus to alter earlier elimination of other candidates
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whose early elimination happens to later cause the elimination of the win-
ning candidate and his replacement by another candidate, weaker than the
targeted challenger.
This means that, unlike what happens under other voting rules, the jus-
tification of the overstating strategy, even when it works, is indirect, giving
a strategic role to relatively weak candidates. This point might be important
in practice. Notice that even in countries that use sequential voting rules
(most often two-round majority) the perceived competition is most often
between the two, and only two, main candidates. A third candidate may
from time to time have a important role too (in which case the proposition
applies), but strategizing on further candidates in the way described above
has, up to my knowledge, never been documented in real political elections.
Furthermore, notice that, for any number of candidates, if all voters
overstate their preferences between the two remaining candidates A,B, and
rank them either first and last or last and first, then, obviously, all other
candidates are immediately eliminated and nothing changes as to the elec-
tion of A. Therefore, the overstating strategy under AV, when it works, can
only be justified under the assumption that not every voter uses it.
Finally, in the simulations which are reported below, one never observed
any instance where the use of the overstating strategy by the disappointed
voters who prefer the second-ranked candidate to the winner was successful.
It may thus be that examples like the one provided in the Appendix should
be considered as academic curiosity.
The conclusion is that, in theory and in practice, the overstating tactic
is not important for AV.
2.2 Replacing
The previous section has shown that a tactic which is natural in other set-
tings does not operate for AV. This does not mean that AV should be con-
sidered as difficult to manipulate. In the remaining of this article will be
demonstrated that there is a very simple and natural logic of manipulation,
which applies to AV (and two-round voting) and provides successful heuris-
tics. The key idea is that if B is losing against A in the final round of an AV
or 2-Round majority election, and if you are not satisfied with this outcome,
then you should try to replace B by another challenger to A. Contrary to
the overstatement logic, this replacement logic implies lowering your appre-
ciation of B. I will show the effects of using such a tactic, in the case of one-
or two-dimensional preferences.
Because the AV voting rule takes as input rankings of candidates, any
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change in the ballot has the form of lowering the rank of some candidates
and improving the rank of some others. The replacement idea specifically
targets the candidate who is eliminated last in the ballot count. It is therefore
defined given the other voters’ votes, or at least given a guess, for instance
a pre-election poll, about who are the two front-runners.
As a heuristic for this idea, suppose that, starting from a profile of
sincere votes in the one-dimensional setting, voters who prefer the last-
eliminated candidate, B, to the winner of the election, A, lower by a fixed
amount δ the utility attached toB, and vote according to this “manipulated”
preference. Depending on the positions of the voter and of the candidates,
this manipulation can have no effect, or it can lower the position of B in the
voter’s ranking. It will have a real impact on the vote if there is another
candidate not far below B according to the voter’s utility, and it will have
no impact if B is much better than the next-preferred candidate.
This manipulation may be seen as a preference change, reflecting a
penalty for not being able to win. By disaffection, B supporters lower their
support to B. This is quite far from a sophisticated strategic reasoning;
indeed, in some cases it may even cause a preference reversal in favor of A
against B. But it sounds plausible from a psychological point of view that
some voters depart from their a priori evaluation of the merit of a candidate
because they realize that this candidate is going to lose.
The logic which is at work here is independent of the fact that the
above “manipulation” is done consciously or not. It can as well (and maybe
better) be interpreted as a “sour grapes” reaction2 of voters who sincerely
say about a loser that “This candidate is not actually all that good to me”
but who would, still sincerely, say something else if the candidate was to
win. “Conscious” and “sour grapes” manipulations are different and cannot
be detected all the same in surveys about preferences and votes, but they
are captured by the same mathematics, which simply describes preference
changes.
We thus have reasons to believe that the replacement tactic is not un-
reasonable from the psychological point of view. It is also meaningful from
the political point of view. In political elections, the electorate is usually
large and preference changes, or “manipulations,” should not be conceived
as simply one voter changing her preference ranking of the candidates. To
be significant, such a move should rather be conceived as changes in the
political status of some candidates, for a non-negligible fraction of the pop-
ulation. With this point in mind the replacement move can be understood
2Thanks to N. Tideman for suggesting this phrase.
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as follows.
The election process is to select two candidates who will be decided, at
the end of the elimination process, according to majority rule. These two
candidates are the most important ones, in the sense that they certainly
focus the attention of the media and the voters. In a sense, this is how
the rule itself presents them because in practice the rule comes to split the
electorate in two, according to these two candidates. What is labeled as
“replacement” here is the fact that voters on the losing side in this duel,
might lower the support for the loser. The political translation might be for
instance that it is more difficult for the loser than for the winner to run
again next time.
The same logic is at work, and well documented, in the pre-election
context. For instance, dealing with the US primaries, Bartels (1988) explains
how republican and democrat supporters dynamically adjust their support
to their party candidates. Typically, those voters who are not satisfied with
the announced party winner because he (or she) would not win at the end
will look for a substitute.
Such pattern of change in stated preferences I label “Heuristic” voting, a
term which leaves open the question of how these changes are decided. One
may note the parallel with evolutionary game theory, which imports concepts
and results usually ascribed to conscious rational behavior and applies to
animal or vegetable populations. Studying the “replacement heuristics” I
will show that in the case of AV some systematic “sour grapes” response
can be as effective as coordinated strategic behavior.
3 Results
3.1 Framework: the preference profile
An example will convey the idea better than a general statement. Consider
5 parties (1,2,3,4,5) located at positions:
x1 = 0, x2 = .4, x3 = .5, x4 = .6, x5 = 1
and N voters, located on the real line. Voters’ positions yi, i = 1, ..., N
are chosen randomly and independently according to a normal distribution
with mean .5 and standard deviation .25. This distribution as well as the
parties’ positions are symmetric around .5. A voter located at position yi
derives utility:
− |yi − xk|
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from the election of party k. Under sincere voting, a voter thus votes for
the party closest to her position. In expectation the percentage of votes for
the different parties are respectively
F (.2) ' 11.51%
F (.45)− F (.2) ' 30.57%
F (.55)− F (.45) ' 15.85%
F (.8)− F (.55) ' 30.57%
1− F (.8) ' 11.51%,
where F denotes the CDF of the above normal distribution. The centrist
party k = 3 is (in expectation) a Condorcet winner: the number of voters
who prefer 3 to 1 (or 5) is 1 − F (.25) ' 84.13% and the number of voters
who prefer 3 to 2 (or 4) is 1− F (.45) ' 57.92%.
3.2 Sincere Voting
If voters vote sincerely under AV one can expect that in the first two rounds
of elimination, the extremist candidates 1 and 5 are eliminated. One of
them, say 1, is eliminated at the first round because he has the smallest
fractions of first-place votes. But in the one-dimensional setting, no voter
who has candidate 1 as her first choice, has candidate 5 as their second
choice, therefore the vote count of 5 does not increase and 5 is eliminated
at the second round. Voters who have 1 as their first choice all have 2 as
their second choice so all 1 votes are transferred to 2 and, likewise, 5 votes
are transferred to 4. It follows that at the third round, candidate 3, the
centrist candidate, has received no transfer and is eliminated. Notice that
this would be true even if the centrist had more first-place votes than the
moderates, provided that he has less first votes than the sum of the votes for
moderate and extremist candidates on each side. Notice also that the same
phenomenon would hold as well with more than 5 candidates, provided that
moderate candidates are not eliminated first.
This mechanical effect of elimination of the extremes, transfers to the
moderates, and squeezing of the center is a characteristic feature of the Hare
process under sincere voting3. The few observations of AV in the laboratory
by Van der Straeten et al. (2010) systematically conform to it.
3Remark that things would be totally different with the Coombs rule: the principle
of eliminating the candidate who is most often ranked last is favorable to the centrist
candidate in the one-dimensional setting, and to consensual candidates in general. One
can check that in one-dimensional profiles with a Condorcet winning, centrist candidate,
the Coombs process systematically elects this candidate, unlike the Hare process.
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k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
initial 11.51 30.57 15.85 30.57 11.51
round 1 0 42.08 15.85 30.57 11.51
round 2 0 42.08 15.85 42.08 0
round 3 0 50 0 50 0
Table 1: Counting sincere votes
Sincere Responsive #
(CM)C (CM)C 2
(CE)C 1
(mM)M (CM)M 99
(CM)C 898
Table 2: Hare transfers with sincere and tactical votes
3.3 Computer simulations
3.3.1 In a one-dimensional model
Computer simulations were done for 99 voters whose positions are randomly
drawn according to the model presented above. For 1, 000 such electorates,
I computed the result of the election under sincere voting, and in particular
the last two remaining candidates, say A and B, with A winning. Then I
modify the utilities of all the voters who prefer B to A, by subtracting δ = .2
to the utility they attach to B. Recall that utilities are counted as distance
between points on the line, with a political spectrum ranging from 0 to 1.
The value δ = .2 thus corresponds to an important, but not overwhelming
change.
Table 2 shows the result of the simulations and should be read as fol-
lows. In two instances it is observed that sincere votes result in the centrist
candidate (C) winning against a moderate (M) candidate, the same out-
come being observed when voters respond to this result the way described
above. In the 998 other instances, sincere votes result in a moderate (say
M) winning against the other moderate (m). Then responsive voting results
in 1 case in a completely different final, with the centrist winning against
an extremist. In all other cases the final round is played between C and M ,
with M winning 99 times and C winning 898 times.
Indeed the candidate elected with this process of disaffection can only
stabilize on a Condorcet winning candidate. If a candidate X is not a Con-
dorcet winner, there is a candidate Y who is preferred by a majority of
9
Number of
candidates
5 10 20
θ = .5 .9163 .8511 .7460
θ = .75 .9156 .8532 .7556
θ = 1 .9105 .8571 .7614
Table 3: Estimated probability of existence of a Condorcet winner in bi-
normal profiles with 50 voters.
voters to X At some point, maybe after some other candidates have been
tested, Y will be the challenger of X, and this Y will win. This implies that
the process cannot stabilize for profiles with no Condorcet-winner. Recip-
rocally, if a Condorcet winner exists, then the process will stabilize. This
describes what is to happen if all dissatisfied voters simultaneously use the
replacement tactic. It is more realistic to imagine that only some voters
would do so. If we interpret the above process as a model of how intended
votes adjust to anticipations (or pools), then it maybe more appropriate to
think that the different voters adjust theirs votes in a sequential, rather than
parallel manner. In any case, the argument remains that the replacement
tactic, rather than the overstatement one, is efficient, and tends to turn the
initial voting rule into a Condorcet-consistent one.
3.3.2 In a two-dimensional model
One may wonder to what extend the above arguments are restricted to
the one-dimensional model. I therefore performed simulations4 using a two-
dimension model, which may be closer to reality. In order to leave free the
possible candidate configurations, which are more complex in two dimensions
than in one, I choose at random the candidate positions. The positions of
voters and candidates are all independently drawn from a bi-variate normal
probability distribution, with standard deviation 1 on the first axis and θ ≤ 1
on the second one (without loss of generality).
To get an idea of the kind of profiles generated by this model, one can
note that, with 50 independent voters, the probability of existence of a
Condorcet-winner candidate is over 90% for 5 candidates, approximately
85% for 10 candidates, and approximately 75% for 20 candidates. More
precisely, simulations on 10,000 random societies provide the figures reported
in Table 3.
4A Mathematica program is available on demand.
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I now present the results of computer simulations with 50 voters and 10
candidates for θ = .75. Out of 1000 such societies, 862 exhibit a Condorcet
winner. The Condorcet winner, when it exists is elected by the Hare pro-
cess with frequency 467/862 = 54% On average, in the last round of the
Hare elimination process, the winning candidate is supported by approx-
imately 60% of the voters, so that when it comes to the “manipulation”
studied in this paper, that is lowering the evaluation of the loser, there is
on average 40% of potential manipulators, precisely 20, 457 out of a total
of 50 × 1000 = 50, 000 voters. Let us suppose that these dissatisfied vot-
ers modify their views by reporting a lower utility for the losing challenger.
With the Euclidean spatial model which is used here, a typical distance be-
tween a candidate and a voter is
√
2 ∗ (1 + (.75)2 ≈ 2.55. I first consider the
case of a slight penalty δ = .2 and then the case of a strong penalty δ = 2.
With a slight penalty, the manipulation results in a different outcome
in a fraction 278/1, 000 = .278 of the elections. See in Table 4 the fourth
column which corresponds to 10 candidates, and the tenth row labeled “Ma-
nipulation change outcome”, for θ = .75 and δ = .2. I obtain that, out of
20, 457 voters who distort their preference statements, 5, 471 end up being
better off and 512 end up being worse off. Given the total number of vot-
ers, these figures represent the respective frequencies indicated in the Table:
40.9%, 10.9% and 1.0%.
Of course, in most cases, the manipulation does not change the result of
the election, but the “small understatement” manipulation, when it has an
effect, is favorable for the manipulators at 90%. The frequency of election
of the Condorcet winner raises from 54% to 569/862 = 66%.
An interesting point is the fact that the effect of the manipulation on the
welfare of the whole electorate is also positive. In the 278 elections where
the manipulation makes a difference, the sum of voters’ utility is increasing
from −61.88 to −59.34 on average per election (figures not shown in the
Table). Such will be also the case in all variants presented below.
Variations with the parameters can be seen in Table 4. With a strong
penalty, the results are very similar, the manipulation has an effect only
slightly more often (334 elections instead of 278), the number of satisfied
manipulators slightly goes up (6, 519 instead of 5, 471) and the (small) num-
ber of manipulators who regret the manipulation goes up accordingly (671
instead of 512).
The parameter θ is by definition between 0 and 1. The case θ = 0
would correspond to a uni-dimensional euclidean model. The case θ = .5 is
intermediate between the case studied in the previous section and the case
θ = .75. One can see from the Table that going from .75 to .5 does not
11
Number of
candidates
5 10 20
θ = .5
Frequency of
profiles with a
Concorcet winner
.924 .852 .726
Potential
manipulators
19,604
39.2%
20,185
40.4%
20,340
40.7%
(δ = .2)
Manipulations
change outcome
.150 .285 .331
Manipulator
is better off
2,921
5.8%
5,473
10.9%
6,368
12.7%
Manipulator
is worse off
234
0.5%
555
1.1%
713
1.4%
(δ = 2)
Manipulations
change outcome
.190 .316 .341
Manipulator is
better off
3750
7.5%
6175
12.3%
6596
13.2%
Manipulator is
worse off
284
0.6%
497
1.0%
693
1.4%
θ = .75
Frequency of
profiles with a
Concorcet winner
.918 .862 .749
Potential
manipulators
19,801
39.6%
20,457
40.9%
20,684
41.4%
(δ = .2)
Manipulations
change outcome
.116 .278 .368
Manipulator
is better off
2,283
4.6%
5,471
10.9%
7,007
14.0%
Manipulator
is worse off
226
0.5%
512
1.0 %
914
1.8%
(δ = 2)
Manipulations
change outcome
.161 .334 .397
Manipulator is
better off
3176
6.4%
6519
13.0%
7652
15.3%
Manipulator is
worse off
327
0.7 %
671
1.3%
894
1.8%
Table 4: Simulation results for bi-normal profiles with 50 voters.
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change much the results.
The most important parameter is the number of candidates. The ma-
nipulations under consideration change the outcome more often when the
number of candidates is large, as can be seen by reading the lines “Manipula-
tions change outcome” in Table 4. Intuitively, it seems that the manipulation
should work more often in cases where there are no Condorcet candidates.
Therefore the observation may be linked to the fact that the Condorcet win-
ner frequency decreases when the umber of candidates increases. Remark
however that, with 50 voters and up to 20 candidates, one remains far away
from theoretical continuous models that predict emptiness of the core; in
fact the probability of existence of a Condorcet winner remains, in these
finite models, above .7. In any case, the simulations show that the phe-
nomenon highlighted in this paper is not restricted to the one-dimensional
model.
4 Conclusion
It is often said that the systems of transferable votes like the Alternative Vote
are resistant to manipulation. Analytical arguments put forth in favor of
this thesis are of two kinds but can be phrased in the same game-theoretical
setting: an n-player game, where n is the number of voters, in which a
player is looking for its optimal ballot choice knowing exactly the other
voters choices (so that the player knows when his personal vote will make a
difference, at any point in the process of elimination).5
First the Computer Science literature has scrutinized the complexity
of finding optimal responses in AV games and found that any algorithm
designed to perform such a task would necessarily be very slow in some
cases (Bartholdi & Orlin 1991). But these kind of results are obtained under
worst-case analysis and that may be a too extreme stand, as to the study of
voting rules (Walsh 2010). The perspective adopted here is quite different:
even if it is very difficult to compute a best response, it may be relatively
easy to find a response simply better than the sincere one.
Moreover following the game-theoretical classical model, the social choice
and welfare literature usually considers manipulation as one and only voter
changing her vote (Aleskerov & Kurbanov 1999). But in practice, in large
elections, voting strategies, if any, are followed by several voters simulta-
neously. Therefore in order to study the manipulability of voting rules for
political elections, it is probably more realistic to imagine, that some frac-
5Moulin (1979) and Bag et al. (2009) study the equilibrium of such games.
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26 25 15 10 23 1
a b c c d d
c c d d a b
b d a b c a
d a b a b c
Table 5: A preference profile
tion of the electorate engage in one tactic or the other, as was done in this
paper.
The remark made in this paper about AV invites to deepen the notion of
correct voting for multi-candidate elections. Lau & Redlawsk (1997) defined
correct voting as the vote for the candidate or party that the voter would
have cast under full information. This definition is operational in the specific
US context (Lau et al. 2008) but preferential voting like the Alternative Vote
raises new problems. In that case, under full information, in particular as
concern the chances of the various candidates, the voter may wish to cast a
ballot which takes the form of a ranking of candidates and is different from
her own preference ranking. Whether this should be labeled as “correct”
voting or not is a matter of definition, but reading word for word the usual
definition as “the vote that the voter would cast under full information” leads
to consider as “correct” a vote that reflects the citizen’s true preferences in
a distorted way.
A Appendix
A.1 A successful “overstating” manipulation under AV
There are 100 voters, whose preference profile is provided in Table 5. The
first collum states that 26 voters rank a first, c second, b third, and d last.
At such a profile, with the Hare system of elimination, d is eliminated
first, with 23 transfers to a and one transfer to d. Then c is eliminated
second but these votes are not transferred to d but to a and b. In the last
round, a wins against b by 64 votes against 36.
Suppose now that the 10 voters with preference c > d > b > a overstate
their preferences between a and b and put b at their first position. They
thus announce b > c > d > a and the new profile is the one in Table 6.
In that case c is eliminated first, giving votes to d. Then a is eliminated
second, and b wins against d in the last round by a 61− 39 margin.
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26 35 15 23 1
a b c d d
c c d a b
b d a c a
d a b b c
Table 6: A modified preference profile
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